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Policy windows, ambiguity and Commission entrepreneurship: explaining the re-
launch of the European Union’s economic reform agenda 
 
Paul Copeland and Scott James 
 
 
ABSTRACT  This paper explains the re-launch of the European Union’s (EU) economic 
reform agenda in 2010. After repeated delays during 2009 the European Commission scaled 
back its initial plan for a revived social dimension and instead proposed a strengthened 
governance architecture of economic surveillance. Using the Multiple Streams Framework 
we argue that the new Europe 2020 strategy which emerged is a product of two overlapping 
policy windows which opened suddenly in the problem stream (the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis) and politics stream (shifting institutional dynamics). This created a window of 
opportunity for skilful policy entrepreneurs to ‘couple’ the three streams by re-framing the 
existing Lisbon Strategy as the EU’s exit strategy from the crisis. The article contributes to 
understanding policy change under conditions of ambiguity by demonstrating the causal 
significance of key temporal and ideational dynamics: the timing of policy windows, access to 
information signals, and the role of policy entrepreneurs. 
KEY WORDS  Europe 2020, European Commission, Lisbon Strategy, policy 
entrepreneurship, windows of opportunity.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Launched in March 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was intended to provide an overarching 
economic reform agenda for the next decade. Despite failing to achieve many of its 
objectives (Tilford and Whyte 2010), the Commission began drawing up proposals for a 
replacement during 2008 in which social and environmental concerns would feature more 
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prominently. By 2009 negotiations had stalled and the consultation process on finding a 
successor to Lisbon was repeatedly delayed. The Europe 2020 strategy which eventually 
emerged in 2010 diverged significantly from this: enshrining a new governance architecture 
of strengthened economic surveillance centred around a new European Semester. The 
cumulative impact of these reforms was to subordinate the strategy’s longer-term social and 
economic objectives to progress in restoring fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic 
stability. 
 
Europe 2020 remains significant as the Commission’s initial strategic response to the 
sovereign debt crisis. However several important puzzles remain. Why was the consultation 
process on replacing the Lisbon Strategy undertaken at such a late stage? Why did the 
Commission change its strategy for re-launching the economic reform agenda? How can we 
explain the unanticipated nature of the governance reforms proposed in Europe 2020? The 
study responds to recent calls for greater attention to be devoted to analysing the temporal 
and ideational dimensions of policy change. It does so by utilising one of the more fruitful 
approaches to have been applied at the European Union (EU) level in recent years: John 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). 
 
The paper begins by outlining three testable propositions derived from the multiple streams 
literature. These are used to explain the development of the Europe 2020 strategy between 
2008 and 2010 and to evaluate the Commission’s role as a policy entrepreneur in the re-
launch of the EU’s economic reform agenda. We conclude by reflecting on how the findings 
add value to our understanding of the EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis. 
 
 
MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK 
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Our motive for using the MSF stems from dissatisfaction with rational institutionalist 
approaches to explaining policy change. First, rational approaches have difficulty explaining 
policy making that does not fit the linear problem-solution sequence. During economic crises 
policy is developed under heightened conditions of ambiguity as policy makers’ attention is 
scarce, information is imperfect, and policy preferences are fluid and opaque. Consequently 
policy makers may act simply to be ‘seen to be doing something’ (Kingdon 1995). Second, 
rational institutionalism downplays the role of agency and ideas in shaping policy change. 
Ideas serve as a cognitive lens through which policy makers process information signals 
about the policy environment and develop political strategies to mobilise action (Radaelli and 
Kraemer 2008). Over time new information causes reflexive agents to re-evaluate policy 
problems and solutions. Finally, rational models ignore the temporal dimension by presenting 
a static snapshot of the policy process. Policy makers face severe time constraints, so the 
timing of events can be crucial to catching policy makers’ attention and creating a historically 
contingent window of opportunity for reform. 
 
The MSF by contrast sets out to demonstrate, rather than assume, rationality (Zahariadis 
2008: 525). The framework has become increasingly popular as a means of analysing policy 
change in Brussels owing to the complexity of the EU’s modes of governance in this 
‘emergent garbage can’ (Richardson 2006: 24-5). Policy makers face high levels of 
ambiguity, defined by the absence of clear policy goals, time constraints, the fluidity of actor 
participation, and the opacity of jurisdictional boundaries. In this context the rational problem-
solution sequence breaks down as political power becomes a more important determinant of 
policy outcomes (Zahariadis 2008). The MSF also facilitates analysis of the ideational and 
temporal dynamics of policy change. It does so by proposing an actor-centred analysis in 
which material pressures are transmitted to policy makers by information signals, interpreted 
through ideational frames, and acted upon with political strategies. Furthermore, the causal 
significance of timing is captured by the temporal conjunction of three independent streams – 
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problems, politics and policies – each of which operates according to a different timescale 
(Borras and Radaelli 2011: 475).  
 
A common criticism is that the three streams only provide a heuristic device. Although the 
approach has generated a series of hypothetical propositions, these have yet to be rigorously 
tested (Zahariadis 2008: 525). In response we review the three most important of these 
claims and formulate a series of theoretically-derived propositions to be tested in the study. 
 
 
1. Information signals and coupling 
 
Coupling is central to explaining how policy windows induce policy change. Windows of 
opportunity constitute information signals from the broader policy environment (such as 
socio-economic or political developments) to which intentional agents respond (Ackrill and 
Kay 2011: 77). Policy makers are alerted to policy problems through feedback mechanisms, 
focusing events and/or increased problem ‘load’. By contrast developments in the politics 
stream are dictated by electoral and legislative timetables which signal shifts in inter- and 
intra-institutional dynamics. In the policy stream solutions emerge from a primeval soup of 
ideas which are advocated by a range of policy making actors. For policy change to occur, 
policy entrepreneurs must respond to these signals by ‘coupling’ the three streams together 
(Zahariadis 2008: 517). Coupling involves the strategic use of ideas through policy framing 
devices: the strategic construction of narratives that mobilise political action around a 
perceived policy problem in order to legitimise a particular solution. As a necessary condition 
for policy change, the absence of coupling provides a plausible explanation for the repeated 
delays to agreeing a successor to the Lisbon Strategy during 2009, leading to our first 
proposition: 
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P1. The delay to agreeing a new economic reform agenda reflected the inability of policy 
entrepreneurs to couple the three streams 
 
 
2. The timing of policy windows 
 
The timing of policy windows is an important determinant of policy selection. Zahariadis 
(2008: 519-20) informs us that when windows open in the problem stream in response to 
focusing events, such as a health scare or natural disaster, the process is consequential: 
policies are designed ‘rationally’ to address real societal problems (‘problems require 
solutions’). By contrast, if windows open in the politics stream policy makers come under 
pressure to be ‘seen to be doing something’. For example, a change of government may lead 
politicians to implement manifesto commitments. In this instance the range of viable policy 
solutions often dictates the problems to be addressed (i.e. ‘solutions chase problems’). 
These hypotheses can be tested through the careful analysis of the timing and sequencing of 
policy developments. This gives rise to the second proposition: 
 
P2. Europe 2020 is a product of a policy window in the: 
a. Problem stream in which ‘problems require solutions’; or 
b. Politics stream in which ‘solutions chase problems’ 
 
 
3. Policy entrepreneurship and policy commissioning 
 
We focus on the Commission’s role as a policy entrepreneur for two main reasons. First, the 
paper seeks to explain the formulation of the EU’s new economic reform strategy, rather than 
the negotiation or implementation of the Europe 2020 agreement. Although we evaluate the 
influence of the Council, the Commission is responsible for periodically reviewing the 
6 
 
strategy’s overarching objectives and governance instruments, providing significant agenda-
setting opportunities (Borras 2009). Second, the Commission occupies a unique ‘hub’ role in 
the economic reform process, combining responsibility for both agenda setting and decision 
making (Zahariadis 2008: 518). Thus it not only advocates policy ideas to decision makers 
(in the Council), but is directly involved in decision making itself.  
 
Ackrill and Kay (2011: 75) provide a useful distinction between policy entrepreneurship (the 
act of selling policies to decision makers) and policy commissioning (the act of selecting 
policies by decision makers). They argue that the capacity of Commission officials to engage 
in entrepreneurship is determined by internal dynamics such as institutional ambiguity, 
defined as ‘a policy-making environment of overlapping institutions lacking a clear hierarchy’ 
(2011: 73). In this situation, policies in one arena may increasingly impact on connected 
policy arenas, forcing a decision where none would have been taken. This policy ‘spillover’ 
can transform the balance of power between policy makers and represents a temporal 
reordering of priorities, signalling to skilful policy entrepreneurs that an opportunity exists to 
re-frame the nature of policy issues and re-shape the agenda. This is particularly relevant to 
agenda setting within broad governance architectures, like Lisbon, which span several 
Commission Directorates-General (DGs) and in which lines of responsibility are unclear 
(Borras 2009). Heightened institutional ambiguity and policy spillover should therefore 
provide greater scope for policy entrepreneurs within the Commission to couple the streams 
and reconfigure the reform agenda. 
 
Policy commissioning points to an alternative coupling mechanism: the ability of 
entrepreneurs to respond to changes in information signals by designing new policies or 
adapting existing ones to ‘fit’ particular policy windows. In the search for legitimate solutions 
to new problems, policy makers will tend to choose from an existing menu of policies in order 
to maximise value acceptability (the degree of support amongst participants) and technical 
feasibility (the ease of implementation) (Zahariadis 2008: 518). We argue that this option is 
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potentially blocked if policies are characterised by negative feedback and evidence of policy 
failure. However policy commissioners may overcome this by revising and re-framing an 
existing solution around a new policy window, thereby providing the policy with a renewed 
raison d’etre. Following this, we test the following claims: 
 
P3. Within the Commission: 
a. Policy entrepreneurs can (re-)shape the policy agenda in response to heightened 
institutional ambiguity and policy spillover 
b. Policy commissioners can exploit new policy windows to overcome perceptions of 
policy failure and renew existing policy solutions 
 
A further criticism of the MSF approach is its lack of specificity with respect to the 
identification of causal variables (Bendor et al 2001). Drawing on Natali’s (2004) model of 
policy change, we identify two sets of independent variables – socio-economic factors and 
political factors – which relate to the problem and politics streams in the MSF, and policy 
change as our dependent variable (in the policy stream). The causal process is the opening 
of a policy window and the coupling of the three streams. We argue that this is conditioned 
by three intervening variables: timing (the point at which policy windows open); information 
signals (about the nature of the window of opportunity); and policy entrepreneurs (who use 
this information to couple the streams). Through careful process tracing of the sequence of 
events, we seek to illuminate the temporal and ideational dimensions of policy change that 
explain the governance reforms enshrined in the Europe 2020 strategy.1 
 
 
EUROPE 2020 
 
In 2000 the Lisbon Council set out a long-term holistic strategy designed to facilitate 
coordination and reform across a broad range of macroeconomic, employment and social 
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policy. Following criticism of policy overload, poor coordination and conflicting priorities in the 
mid-term review chaired by Wim Kok, the Lisbon Strategy was re-launched in 2005 with a 
narrower focus on growth and jobs, a new simplified set of Integrated Guidelines, and a 
streamlined multi-annual review process. Despite these modest reforms, the procedure for 
‘naming and shaming’ Member States was never fully implemented (for an overview see 
Begg 2007). 
 
Set against this backdrop the Commission’s draft proposals for the Europe 2020 strategy, 
agreed by national leaders at European Council summits in March and May 2010, 
constituted a significant revision of the economic reform agenda. Like Lisbon, Europe 2020 is 
guided by a series of headline targets and ‘thematic’ priorities related to employment policy, 
poverty reduction, research and development and climate change aimed at raising Europe’s 
competitiveness (European Commission 2010a, 2010b). But in response to the crisis the 
strategy proposed a step change in economic policy coordination through reinforced 
mechanisms of budgetary discipline and fiscal consolidation (see Armstrong 2012). To bring 
this about Europe 2020 enshrined a new preventive system of ex ante surveillance, the 
centrepiece of which was a new annual ‘European Semester’. This necessitated three 
specific governance innovations. First, on the basis of the economic priorities set out in the 
Commission’s new Annual Growth Survey, governments submit medium-term budgetary and 
economic strategies for peer review prior to parliamentary approval. This is achieved through 
the ‘simultaneous’ but ‘separate’ reporting and evaluation of Europe 2020 with the EU’s fiscal 
framework, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Second, to strengthen the surveillance of 
macroeconomic imbalances, the Commission proposed to develop new competitiveness 
scoreboards to measure productivity, employment and public/private debt. Finally, the ability 
of the EU to offer tailored policy advice through Country Specific Recommendations was 
widened to include both macro- and microeconomic issues. The Commission also gained the 
additional right to apply political pressure on Member States by issuing ‘policy warnings’ 
under the new Lisbon Treaty.  
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The following sections explain how and why these important governance reforms came 
about. We begin by detailing the slow pace of reform prior to 2010. 
 
 
RETHINKING LISBON: FAILED COUPLING 
 
In March 2008 the European Council endorsed the final three years of the Lisbon Strategy 
and instructed the Commission to start reflecting on the EU’s economic and social priorities 
beyond 2010 (European Council 2008). Discussion within the Council focused on the need 
for Lisbon’s successor to move away from the narrow growth and jobs agenda of Lisbon ‘II’ 
(from 2005-2010) by addressing rising public concern about energy, the environment and 
climate change. The Commission also began formulating plans for a more prominent ‘Social 
Agenda’ as a way of addressing criticism from stakeholders that the strategy had failed to 
connect sufficiently with society (EurActiv 2008). Despite this initial surge of activity, the 
momentum soon slowed and in March 2009 national leaders decided to postpone further 
talks. Progress stalled because of an absence of leadership from both main EU institutions. 
In the European Council there was little enthusiasm to champion structural reform in the 
midst of severe recession, the influence of traditional cheerleaders (such as the UK) had 
waned, and other countries were distracted by domestic economic challenges (Martens and 
Zuleeg 2009). Its ability to provide leadership was also weakened at this time by the collapse 
of the Czech government which held the rotating presidency. Similarly, the Commission was 
hamstrung by uncertainty surrounding the composition of the new college of commissioners, 
due to be confirmed in the autumn. In the second half of 2009 the Swedish presidency made 
a concerted effort to recast the Lisbon Strategy along Nordic lines, but their ambition of 
agreeing preliminary conclusions was abandoned due to the worsening recession.2 This 
political vacuum provided fertile ground for mounting criticism of Lisbon’s failures and 
scepticism about the likelihood of the strategy ever being re-launched.3  
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The evidence suggests that the lack of early progress can be attributed to a failure of 
coupling, confirming proposition 1. In the problem stream a range of new social and 
environmental problems had been identified, but there was little agreement over how these 
should be prioritised. In the politics stream, Europe 2020 had no national cheerleader in the 
Council to drive it along (unlike Lisbon) and EU-level leadership was absent pending the 
appointment of the new Commission. Policy entrepreneurs could therefore not couple the 
three streams because although new problems existed, political action could not be 
mobilised. More importantly, these early initiatives were largely isolated from the EU’s 
broader response to the global financial crisis. As one official put it, during the initial phase of 
brainstorming the effects of the crisis on the Lisbon Strategy were not fully understood or 
even considered.4 The crisis could not serve as a driver of reform at this stage because 
policy makers did not make the connection between the fiscal position of the Member States 
and the EU’s economic reform agenda. 
 
 
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: THE PROBLEM STREAM 
 
The nature and timing of different policy windows is central to our explanation of policy 
change. With reference to proposition 2, we find that Europe 2020 is a product of two 
overlapping policy windows. The first of these opened gradually in the problem stream 
towards the end of 2009. The trigger was not the long-running financial crisis or the 
worsening economic recession, but rather the focusing event constituted by mounting 
speculation about sovereign default in Greece. As one official explained, the wake-up call for 
policy makers was increasing speculation surrounding the potential for a sovereign debt 
crisis spreading to several Member States, calling into question the sustainability of the 
eurozone for the first time.5 As attention increasingly focused on the relationship between 
microeconomic reform (as part of the Lisbon Strategy) and fiscal sustainability (under the 
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framework of the Stability and Growth Pact), so efforts at defining the aims and objectives of 
the new strategy were thrown into flux. Using Kingdon’s terminology, the Greek crisis 
triggered heightened levels of ambiguity as officials struggled to make sense of the 
proliferation of information signals emanating from the rapidly changing external environment 
(problem ‘load’).  
 
Policy windows do not by themselves induce policy change: rather policy entrepreneurs must 
exploit them by coupling the three streams together. This is confirmed by the fact that the 
timing of this particular policy window had the initial effect of derailing the Commission’s 
timetable for launching a public consultation in September 2008. The source of the delay was 
doubts about the Commission’s initial plan for a revived social agenda and continued 
uncertainty surrounding the formation of the second Barroso Commission.6 The delay bought 
the Commission some valuable time, generating new meanings and understandings about 
the causes and consequences of the crisis and enabling policy makers to begin redefining 
the nature of the problem. However the consultation process, which eventually ran from 
November 2009 to January 2010, provided only a fleeting window of opportunity for 
stakeholders to influence the drafting of the new economic reform agenda. 
 
The prospect of substantive policy change remained bleak. With little over three months 
before Lisbon expired, the consultation document was deliberately vague, lacking any 
detailed proposals for governance reforms beyond increasing the role of the European 
Parliament. This lack of ambition provoked a storm of protest from some NGOs and MEPs 
who wanted the process delayed to the end of 2010 and led national governments to call on 
the Commission to develop an ambitious social plan to address rising unemployment 
(European Parliament 2009). Process tracing suggests that the Commission’s timidity can be 
explained by its inability to couple the new policy window in the problem stream because of 
continued obstacles in the politics stream. 
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WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: THE POLITICS STREAM 
 
Two inter-institutional developments in early 2010 signalled the sudden opening of a new 
policy window in the politics stream. First, following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
Herman van Rompuy was elected as the new President of the European Council and 
announced that addressing the economic crisis was his first priority. Second, after a four 
month delay the new Commission was finally confirmed on 9 February 2010. The President, 
Jose Manuel Barroso, was determined to address criticism that he had been slow to respond 
to the crisis by making Europe 2020 the centrepiece of his second term (Dinan 2010). 
Recognising that only the European Council could provide the requisite political credibility to 
move the proposals forward, the two presidents agreed to establish a series of regular 
meetings and an informal division of labour through which to kick start the economic reform 
process (European Voice 2010; Dinan 2011). At a specially convened summit on 11 
February 2010 Barroso outlined plans for new policy initiatives and targets, while van 
Rompuy focused on compliance and enforcement. In addition they agreed that to secure 
greater buy-in from Member States, the Commission would extend the length of the policy 
window by presenting the broad contours of an agreement in March but leave detailed 
discussion of governance reforms to the June summit (Zuleeg 2010). The alliance of the 
EU’s two new presidents was therefore pivotal in unlocking the political process and creating 
the conditions for effective policy entrepreneurship. 
 
The role of national governments – acting either individually or collectively – was limited for 
four reasons. First, the European Council was slow to react to the warning signs from Greece 
and recognise that it even necessitated a European-level response (Zahariadis 2012: 106). 
German hesitation further prolonged the negotiations surrounding the first bailout and rapidly 
consumed the scarce attention of national leaders. Second, although ECOFIN and the 
Eurogroup became more important in managing the EU’s response to the sovereign debt 
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crisis, this firefighting role did not translate into effective strategic leadership on economic 
reform (Puetter 2012). Third, the incoming Spanish presidency was firmly in favour of 
securing agreement on Europe 2020 but determined to play a backseat role to permit the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms (Molina 2010). Finally, a continued lack of 
enthusiasm (notably from Germany) and divisions about the desirability of governance 
reform hindered the capacity of the Council to engage in effective policy entrepreneurship.  
 
The national position papers submitted during consultation process reveal support for the 
Commission’s ambition that the new strategy should address the fiscal and macroeconomic 
challenges emerging from the eurozone crisis. Beyond this however different coalitions 
formed around the need for further governance reforms. A sizeable coalition of southern and 
eastern states called for enhanced governance through binding economic convergence 
criteria, greater use of legislative instruments and the integration of Europe 2020 with the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).7 In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty ratification process 
however the political climate was not conducive to any further expansion of the EU’s legal 
competence.8 Opposition to substantive reforms came from the larger states, led by 
Germany and the Netherlands, both of whom rejected the Commission’s proposal to 
undertake simultaneous reporting of the SGP and Europe 2020 as it could be counter-
productive to budgetary consolidation and would make surveillance ‘unnecessarily political’.9 
The UK and France also opposed further supranationalisation, presenting alternative 
intergovernmental solutions to the search for better coordination. 
 
Although yielding few surprises, the consultation process acted as a powerful feedback 
mechanism, signalling to policy makers that a new policy window had opened (as national 
governments welcomed the re-framing of the strategy around the eurozone crisis) but also 
indicating the limits of what was politically feasible (as significant opposition to strengthened 
governance remained). In the face of deep rooted divisions within the Council, strategic 
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policy entrepreneurs in the Commission attempted to exploit this political vacuum by re-
shaping the agenda. 
 
 
POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
The opening of a policy window in the politics stream was also signalled by the 
transformation of intra-institutional dynamics within the new Commission: in particular, the 
replacement of Spanish socialist Joaquin Almunia as economic and financial affairs 
commissioner by the Finnish liberal Olli Rehn. As well as being a trusted lieutenant to the 
Commission President, Rehn heralded a change of direction by declaring his priority for the 
new reform agenda to be the restoration of healthy public finances through the enforcement 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (EU Observer 2010). These information signals were used 
by policy entrepreneurs in DG Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) to seize control of 
the drafting process within the Commission and recast the strategy on its own terms. 
 
The extent of these changes becomes clear when we compare the governance of Europe 
2020 with the Lisbon Strategy. After the re-launch of 2005, the strategy was managed by a 
team of Commission desk officers drawn from the Secretariat-General, DG ECFIN, DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), and DG Enterprise and Industry (DG 
ENTR); with the other DGs providing an input as and when necessary.10 In the 
implementation of Lisbon, the DGs had a roughly equal status: each being responsible for 
monitoring developments within their particular policy domain, while decisions on evaluation 
and policy recommendations were reached through consensus.11 The governance of the 
Lisbon Strategy was therefore characterised by a high level of institutional ambiguity and 
policy spillover. Put simply, because policy decisions were closely interconnected, different 
Commission DGs were forced to share ownership and develop a consensual approach to 
decision making. However the absence of a clear hierarchy of authority also created a wider 
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space for contestation, contributing to the conflicting aims and objectives that characterised 
the early strategy. Contrary to proposition 3a this situation undermined, rather than 
enhanced, policy entrepreneurship within the Commission. 
 
By contrast the drafting of Europe 2020 was marked by clearer lines of responsibility, 
stronger internal hierarchies and reduced contestation. Once the new Commission had been 
confirmed, President Barroso and his colleagues in the Secretariat General forged a strategic 
alliance with Commissioner Rehn and DG ECFIN in order to ensure that the Commission 
would play a leading role in reshaping the EU’s future economic governance.12 Not only did 
the majority of ideas behind Europe 2020, the new Annual Growth Survey and the European 
Semester originate from within DG ECFIN, but the other DGs were largely sidelined or 
ignored during the drafting process.13 Decision making authority which had hitherto spanned 
several different DGs was therefore gradually centralised around a single institutional 
location. This evidence contradicts the claim in proposition 3a that heightened ambiguity and 
policy spillover creates greater scope for policy entrepreneurship. Counter-intuitively we find 
that skilful policy entrepreneurs within DG ECFIN were empowered by the policy windows to 
claim ownership of the issue and seize control of the agenda. This enabled them to reduce 
institutional ambiguity over who would be responsible for drafting Europe 2020 and reverse 
policy spillover between competing Commission departments – a process we refer to as 
policy ‘spillback’. 
 
 
COUPLING THE THREE STREAMS 
 
The final part of our explanation examines how the Commission successfully coupled the 
three streams together to secure agreement on the Europe 2020 reforms. Using our 
framework, we consider the role of DG ECFIN in policy commissioning: the selection of 
policies that fit particular policy windows. At the start of 2010 policy makers faced complex 
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and at times contradictory information signals arising from the policy windows that opened 
simultaneously in the problem and politics streams. These generated autonomous pressures 
for policy change: the Commission had to be seen to be responding effectively to the 
sovereign debt crisis (the problem stream); and devise a replacement to the Lisbon Strategy 
by a fixed deadline (the politics stream). Consequently the option of no change (by simply 
renewing the existing Lisbon Strategy) was unavailable as it would not have been perceived 
as an effective response. Yet the Commission also lacked a mandate (from the Council) and 
sufficient time (before the summit deadline) to secure agreement on radical change through 
an expansion of the EU’s legal competence.  
 
Nonetheless these information signals proved decisive in enabling DG ECFIN to couple the 
three streams together. This process took two forms. First, officials redefined the nature of 
the problem that needed to be addressed around the eurozone crisis, enabling Europe 2020 
to be explicitly framed as the EU’s ‘exit strategy’ from the crisis (policy framing). Second, 
policy solutions were selected to fit the overlapping policy window: that is, reforms which 
appeared to address the underlying causes of the sovereign debt crisis but which could also 
be agreed by the political deadline of the European Council summit (policy commissioning). 
We analyse each of these in turn.  
 
The Commission consultation process yielded valuable information signals which were 
exploited by policy entrepreneurs in DG ECFIN to re-frame the economic reform agenda. 
The submissions convinced officials that the crisis could provide a powerful new narrative 
and the necessary political impetus to re-launch the process. They were aided by several 
Member States pushing for a successor to the Lisbon Strategy which contained ‘something 
new’ in order to ‘prevent another Greece’.14 DG ECFIN therefore set about re-framing the 
new strategy, acknowledging Lisbon’s failings and recasting Europe 2020 as a ‘bold policy 
response’ to the crisis.15 This required strengthened economic surveillance to coordinate the 
withdrawal of national stimulus measures and to manage the ‘advanced interdependence’ 
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that now existed within the eurozone. In the run up to the March summit the growing sense of 
urgency enabled the Commission to ratchet up the pressure even further, causing hitherto 
sceptical governments to soften their opposition to stronger economic governance (EurActiv 
2010). 
 
Having secured the European Council’s endorsement for the broad outline of Europe 2020, 
the Commission immediately set about selecting a series of governance reforms appropriate 
to the policy window that existed. The plan for a new European Semester of ex ante 
economic surveillance ‘raised eyebrows’ when it was first presented in Brussels in May as it 
unexpectedly proposed that the EU should scrutinise Member State budgets before national 
parliaments (EurActiv 2010). It also confirmed and reinforced the reconfiguration of power 
within the Commission by ensuring that DG ECFIN remained firmly in control of the new 
surveillance process.16 In a notable concession to Germany, the reporting and evaluation of 
Europe 2020 and the SGP would remain ‘separate’ in order to ensure the integrity of the 
EU’s fiscal rules. This compromise allowed DG ECFIN to propose ‘something new’ while 
stopping short of the formal integration of Europe 2020 with the SGP.17 In doing so however 
it rendered the achievement of the strategy’s longer-term economic objectives dependent 
upon the more immediate priority of restoring budgetary discipline. The cumulative effect was 
therefore to effectively subordinate the Commission’s earlier plan for a revived social and 
environmental agenda to progress in restoring fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic 
stability. The degree to which this diverged from the Commission’s initial strategy for re-
launching Lisbon provoked a backlash from social NGOs, many of whom accused the 
Commission of reneging on earlier assurances to emphasise social protection in favour of an 
agenda that reinforced austerity (Lücking 2010). 
 
We conclude by confirming proposition 3b: policy commissioners successfully coupled a 
revised policy solution (the Lisbon Strategy) around a new policy problem (the sovereign 
debt crisis) by the political deadline (the European Council summit). In order to increase the 
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likelihood of finding agreement in the limited time available, DG ECFIN selected a solution 
from an existing policy menu in order to maximise its value acceptability (as it complemented 
rather than contradicted the Stability and Growth Pact) and technical feasibility (because it 
built upon governance arrangements developed under the Lisbon Strategy). More 
importantly, negative policy feedback and perceptions of policy failure were overcome by 
substantively revising and re-legitimating the proposed solution around the emergence of a 
new policy window in the problem stream (by framing Europe 2020 as the EU’s exit strategy 
from the crisis). In doing so the Commission was able to secure agreement on an important 
series of reforms which established a new governance architecture of economic surveillance. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At the start we posed three propositions as a means to assess the explanatory value of the 
Multiple Streams Framework, the results of which are summarised in table 1. Through careful 
process tracing we demonstrate that the governance reforms enshrined in Europe 2020 are 
best explained through the temporal conjunction of three independent streams. The 
framework confirms that there is no simple linear relationship between socio-economic or 
political factors (the independent variables) and policy outcomes (the dependent variable). 
By analysing critical temporal and ideational dynamics, the study reveals the causal process 
to be highly contingent and mediated by the timing of policy windows, access to information 
signals, and the role of policy entrepreneurs (the intervening variables). We argue that the 
MSF constitutes more than a heuristic device: through the formulation of theoretically-derived 
propositions it can provide a rigorous explanatory framework for analysing policy change 
under conditions of heightened ambiguity.  
 
Table 1 
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The paper concludes with three observations about how it contributes to our understanding 
of the EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis. 
 
 
1. Policy entrepreneurship/commissioning 
 
The analysis of the coupling process provides new insights into sources of supranational 
autonomy within broad governance architectures like economic reform. In particular, the MSF 
serves to qualify zero-sum based accounts of power which assume that the Commission has 
been irrevocably weakened by the eurozone crisis (for example Dinan 2011; Puetter 2012). 
In fact we find that the Commission served as the principal source of ideas behind Europe 
2020 and the motor driving the agreement. It secured agreement on substantive governance 
reforms in the face of significant odds: economic turmoil (in the eurozone), institutional 
uncertainty (in the Commission and Council), negative policy feedback (the Lisbon Strategy), 
and Member State opposition (led by Germany). The new agenda also served the wider 
political purpose of demonstrating the Commission’s ability to remain relevant and act 
decisively in the midst of the economic crisis (Armstrong 2012: 214). 
 
We view our paper as contributing to a growing body of strategic constructivist literature 
which suggests that the Commission’s agenda setting power is more significant than rational 
models would predict (for example Jabko 2006; Radaelli and Kraemer 2008). Analysed 
through the lens of multiple streams, our paper supports the assertion that the Commission 
acts as a ‘purposeful opportunist’ in response to the opening of windows of opportunity 
(Cram 1994). It does so in three ways. First, by providing policy makers with real and urgent 
policy problems to address, focusing events like economic crises can increase the scope for 
policy entrepreneurs to mobilise political action behind particular solutions through the 
construction of new strategic narratives (policy framing). Second, skilful policy entrepreneurs 
can exploit new sources of information to reduce institutional ambiguity and reverse policy 
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spillover by centralising responsibility and seizing control of the policy agenda (policy 
spillback). This contributes to Kingdon’s model by demonstrating that the opening of policy 
windows can facilitate bureaucratic power ‘grabs’ by those best positioned to interpret and 
respond to shifting signals about the wider policy environment. Finally, policy makers can 
increase the scope for reform by reconfiguring existing policy solutions to fit new policy 
windows (policy commissioning). In the case of Europe 2020 negative feedback and 
perceptions of policy failure ruled out the option of policy renewal. Instead the Lisbon 
Strategy had to be more substantively revised and re-framed as a legitimate solution to a 
new policy problem. 
 
Crucially however we find that policy entrepreneurship is not a simple function of an agent’s 
structural position, but instead is fluid, dynamic and relational in nature. In the case of Europe 
2020, DG ECFIN was only able to capture the drafting process through the formation of 
strategic alliances with two other institutional actors: the Commission Secretariat General 
and the European Council President. The first was cemented by the appointment of Rehn as 
the new ECFIN commissioner, heralding a change of direction in the Commission’s strategy 
for re-launching Lisbon. The second led to the establishment of a division of labour between 
the EU’s two presidents which provided the necessary political impetus to re-ignite the 
process. The findings suggest that where national governments are agnostic and/or divided 
over reform, an ‘unholy alliance’ of the Commission and European Council Presidents can 
exert significant influence in re-shaping the pace and content of the reform agenda. 
 
 
2. The timing of policy windows 
 
The timing and sequencing of policy windows exerts a direct causal effect on the likelihood 
and nature of policy change. By carefully tracing the process through which independent 
policy windows open in different streams over time, the framework facilitates the identification 
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of causal variables (socio-economic and political factors) and allows us to map their 
differential impact on policy change. This gives rise to two significant insights. First, the 
opening of simultaneous policy windows in different streams can alter the length and breadth 
of the reform process. In the case of Europe 2020, this had the effect of widening and 
shortening the window of opportunity for policy change because the Commission had to 
devise a strategy for addressing the underlying causes of the sovereign debt crisis (thus 
widening the scope for agreement) by a fixed political deadline (due to the expiry of the 
Lisbon Strategy). 
 
Second, overlapping policy windows shape policy outcomes in unpredictable ways. 
Zahariadis (2008) argues that when windows open in the problem stream, policies are 
designed rationally to address real problems; by contrast windows in the politics stream lead 
policy makers to search for problems to address through pre-existing solutions. Yet neither of 
these outcomes accurately describes the development of Europe 2020. On the one hand the 
analysis confirms that policy makers may not respond to urgent policy problems in the way 
that rational models would predict (i.e. problems require solutions) because the existence of 
a policy window in the politics stream can empower some policy makers at the expense of 
others. On the other hand the opening of a window in the problem stream impacts directly in 
the political arena by limiting the extent to which viable solutions can simply dictate the range 
of problems to be addressed (i.e. solutions chasing problems).  
 
We propose a third outcome which occurs when policy windows overlap. In this situation the 
need to address real policy problems by a clear political deadline privileges those actors 
capable of devising the most viable policy solution in the limited time available. This is most 
likely to entail devising a ‘quick fix’ solution by reconfiguring an existing policy around a new 
problem. In early 2010 the opening of policy windows in both streams limited policy makers’ 
room for manoeuvre by ruling out the options of no change and radical reform. But in this 
situation DG ECFIN was ideally placed to hastily craft a solution by coupling a revised policy 
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(the Lisbon Strategy) around a new problem (the sovereign debt crisis) so as to secure 
agreement by the political deadline (the European Council summit). The outcome (Europe 
2020 and the European Semester) we label solutions fit problems.  
 
 
3. Information signals 
 
Unlike rational institutionalism, the MSF facilitates analysis of the ideational dynamics of 
policy change. The causal significance of policy windows derives, in large part, from the 
critical role that information signals play in linking material pressures to intentional agents. 
These provide knowledge and awareness about windows of opportunity for reform, but also 
constitute a valuable source of meanings and understandings about the policy environment. 
At critical junctures new information can cause policy makers to reinterpret their existing 
cognitive lenses, triggering sudden and unexpected shifts in political strategy. Evidence for 
this comes from the failure of EU policy makers to adjust their strategy for re-launching 
Lisbon in response to the ongoing financial crisis and deteriorating fiscal situation until a very 
late stage. Careful process tracing confirms that this delay was not simply a consequence of 
political obstacles but also cognitive ones. Policy makers were simply slow to make the 
connection between the crisis and the Lisbon Strategy as a consequence of heightened 
ambiguity and a scarcity of attention.  
 
Information signals also clarify the process by which ideas serve as a source of power within 
the EU (Zaharaidis 2008: 527). The focusing event that caused officials to re-evaluate their 
strategy was speculation surrounding Greece’s sovereign debt. The timing of these 
information signals, coinciding with the Commission consultation process, was critical in 
providing certain policy makers with the necessary source of ideas to identify linkages with 
the economic reform agenda. DG ECFIN exploited these signals to craft a more convincing 
narrative about the need to prioritise fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stability at the 
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expense of those calling for the prioritisation of growth-friendly investment and social 
cohesion (such as DG EMPL and social NGOs). Our analysis confirms that this framing 
process was not simply strategic, but instead rooted in the generation of new meanings and 
understandings about the functioning of the eurozone which caused policy makers to hastily 
re-evaluate their policy preferences. Rather from conforming to the rational problem-solution 
model, the picture we present of Europe 2020 is of a process characterised by high levels of 
ambiguity and shaped by important temporal and ideational dynamics which provided 
significant scope for skilful policy entrepreneurs to manipulate the final outcome. 
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NOTES 
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1. The paper draws upon twelve anonymous interviews conducted in late 2010 in the 
Commission and Council. 
2. Sweden’s ambitions centred around prioritising flexicurity, Life Long Learning and 
gender equality (Social Platform 2009). 
3. Lisbon was criticised by several national leaders (for example, Deutsche Welle 2010), 
while a senior French diplomat suggested it was ‘no longer a priority’ in the current 
economic climate (EurActiv 2009). 
4. Interview DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010. 
5. Interview DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010. 
6. Interview Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010. 
7. This group included Spain, Belgium, Italy, Denmark and Portugal, plus most east 
European members (national position papers available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/eu2020/contrib_member_states_en.htm). 
8. Interview Commission Secretariat General 23 November 2010. 
9. In the run up to the March summit Chancellor Merkel appeared to openly question the 
need to reach a deal at the June summit (Financial Times Deutschland 2010). 
10. Interview DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010. 
11. Interview Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010. 
12. Interviews DG Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010; Commission Secretariat 
General, 23 November 2010. 
13. Interview DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 4 November 2010. 
14. Interviews Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010; DG Economic and 
Financial Affairs, 8 December 2010. 
15. Interviews DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 4 November 2010; DG 
Enterprise and Industry, 8 November 2010. 
16. Interview DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 8 December 2010; Commission 
Secretariat General, 23 November 2010. 
17. Interview Commission Secretariat General, 23 November 2010. 
25 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ackrill, R. and Kay, A. (2011) ‘Multiple streams in EU policy-making: the case of the 2005 
sugar reform’, Journal of European Public Policy 18(1): 72-89  
 
Armstrong, K.A. (2012) ‘The Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020: From the Governance of Co-
ordination to the Co-ordination of Governance’. In D. Papadimitriou and P. Copeland (eds.) 
The EU’s Lisbon Strategy: Evaluating Success, Understanding Failure, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp.208-28 
 
Begg, I. (2007) Lisbon II, Two Years on: An Assessment of the Partnership for Growth and 
Jobs Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies 
 
Bendor, J., Moe, T. and Shott, K. (2001) ‘Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the 
Research Program’, American Political Science Review 95: 169-190 
 
Borrás, S. (2009) ‘The politics of the Lisbon strategy: The changing role of the Commission’, 
West European Politics 32(1): 97-118 
 
Borrás, S. and Radaelli, C. (2011) ‘The Politics of Governance Architectures: Creation, 
Change and Effects of the EU Lisbon Strategy’, Journal of European Public Policy 18(4): 
463-84 
 
Cram. L. (1994) ‘The European Commission as a Multi-Organization: Social and Information 
Technology Policy-Making in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 1(2): 
195-217. 
26 
 
 
Deutsche Welle (2010) ‘Spain calls for binding EU economic goals – and penalties’, 8 
January 2010. http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,5098907,00.html?maca=en-
current_affairs_europe-105-rdf 
 
Dinan, D. (2010) ‘Institutions and Governance: A New Treaty, A Newly Elected Parliament 
and a New Commission’, Journal of Common Market Studies 48 Annual Review: 95-118 
 
Dinan, D. (2011) ‘Institutions and Governance: Implementing the Lisbon Treaty in the 
Shadow of the Euro Crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49 Annual Review: 103-121 
 
EurActiv (2008) ‘EU Lisbon Agenda gets social makeover’, 18 March 2008. 
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/eu-lisbon-agenda-gets-social-mak-news-
219576 
 
EurActiv (2009) ‘EU leaders put Lisbon revamp on the back burner’, 24 March 2009. 
http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/leaders-put-lisbon-revamp-back-b-news-221470 
 
EurActiv (2010) ‘Brussels unveils economic 2020 roadmap for Europe’, 3 March 2010 
http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/brussels-unveils-2020-economic-r-news-302202 
 
European Commission (2009) ‘Consultation on the Future EU 2020 Strategy’, Commission 
Working Document, COM (2009) 647 final, 24 November 2009 
 
European Commission (2010a) ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’, Commission Communication, COM (2010) 2020 final, 3 March 2010 
 
27 
 
European Commission (2010b) ‘Reinforcing economic policy coordination’, Commission 
Communication COM (2010) 250 final, 12 May 2010 
 
European Council (2008) Brussels European Council Conclusions, 13/14 March 2008 
 
EU Observer (2010) ‘Rehn talks tough on public deficits’, 12 January 2010. 
http://euobserver.com/9/29243 
 
European Parliament (2009) ‘Put off summit to strengthen recovery plan’, Press Release, 
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, 1 December 2012. 
 
European Voice (2010) ‘Van Rompuy looks for more informality’, 4 February 2010. 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/van-rompuy-looks-for-more-informality-
/67038.aspx 
 
Financial Times Deutschland (2010) ‘Merkel pfeift Barroso zurück’, 1 March 2010. 
 
Jabko, N. (2006) Playing the Market. A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985–2005 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
 
Kingdon, J. (1995) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies New York: Longman 
 
Lücking, S. (2010) ‘Debate about social dimension of Europe 2020 strategy’, European 
Industrial Relations Online Observatory, 24 May 2010 
 
Martens, H. and Zuleeg, F. (2009) ‘Where next for the Lisbon Agenda?’, Policy Brief, 
European Policy Centre, June 2009. 
 
28 
 
Molina, I. (2010) ‘The 2010 Spanish EU Presidency’, Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies. www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2010_1op.pdf. 
 
Natali, D. (2004) ‘Europeanization, policy arenas, and creative opportunism: the politics of 
welfare state reforms in Italy’, Journal of European Public Policy 11(6): 1077-1095 
 
Puetter, U. (2012) ‘Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Council and 
European Council in EU economic governance’, Journal of European Public Policy 19(2): 
161-178 
 
Radaelli, C. and Kraemer, U. (2008) ‘Governance Areas in EU Direct Tax Policy’, Journal of 
Common Market Policy 46(2): 315-336 
 
Richardson, J. (ed.) (2006) European Union: Power and Policy-Making, 3rd edition, London 
and New York: Routledge 
 
Social Platform (2009) ‘Swedes push for Nordic flavor to Lisbon Strategy II’, 13 July 2009. 
http://www.socialplatform.org/News.asp?news=22063 
 
Tilford, S. and Whyte, P. (2010) The Lisbon Scorecard X Brussels: Centre for Economic 
Reform 
 
Zahariadis, N. (2008) ‘Ambiguity and choice in European public policy’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 15(4): 514-530. 
 
Zahariadis, N. (2012) ‘Complexity, coupling and policy effectiveness: the European response 
to the Greek sovereign debt crisis’, Journal of Public Policy 32(2): 99-116. 
 
29 
 
Zuleeg, M. (2010) ‘The European Council: balancing short term crisis and long term 
strategy’, Commentary, European Policy Centre, 24 March 2010. 
